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JOINT INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS COMMITTEE

Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions

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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
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No. 16

1. SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. The Soviet armed forces in being are in an advanced state of readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations with no additional warning. There are indications of Soviet hostile intentions, but the activity apparent during the week was insufficient to indicate a probability of imminent Soviet hostilities.
- b. Chinese Communist activity indicates continued military preparations in North China and Manchuria for the support of extended, long-term operations in Korea. The military activity of Chinese Communist troops in Korea so far is not sufficient to indicate the existence of a plan for major offensive operations, and the action at present appears to have been undertaken with the objective of prolonging attritional warfare against the U.N. forces. The extensive Chinese preparatory measures against the contingency of war indicate that the Communist regime has anticipated that its actions may result in the extension of the conflict into Manchuria and the remainder of China.
- c. Viet Minh activity indicates a policy of constant harassment of French forces while the Viet Minh build-up for major operations continues. There is continuing evidence of increasing Communist dissident activity in Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia and Malaya.
- d. Soviet and Communist activity in Europe indicates that military and political preparations there are continuing despite an apparent previous lull in Soviet aggressiveness. There is evidence of a continuing build-up of Satellite forces, particularly in East Germany.

2. SUMMARY OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

- a. KOREA-CHINA. --Enemy forces in Korea showed no signs of preparing a general defense line or of offensive intentions. Captured Chinese Communist troops have been poorly trained, ill-supplied and show no great desire to fight U.S. forces. It is probable that the pilots of enemy jets in Korea are Chinese

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Communists, although the possibility that Soviet pilots have made flights over Korea should not be ruled out. There are continuing indications of a northward movement of Chinese Communist troops from South and East China, of the movement of Soviet personnel northward from Shanghai, and of accelerated defensive preparations in South and East China. Communist propaganda continued to charge that the U.S. is preparing to attack China, and a North Korean announcement stated that their retreat was temporary and in preparation for a decisive blow against the Americans.

- b. **INDO-CHINA.**--The Viet Minh are maintaining constant pressure on French units in Tonkin by small-scale action, while the build-up for future major operations is continuing with logistical aid from China. There are no firm indications of a major attack in the near future, although the French believe that a determined general Viet Minh attack will be launched in December and the possibility of imminent Viet Minh action in Laos has been reported.
- c. **INDONESIA.**--Communist-inspired raids have destroyed half of Java's tobacco crop and the struggle between left-wing groups and the government will probably be intensified in coming weeks.
- d. **BURMA-TIBET.**--Small numbers of Chinese Communist troops are reported moving through the Kachin territory of northern Burma enroute to Tibet. Information indicates that the Chinese advance on Tibet has halted in Sikang Province and that Chinese forces are not yet in Tibet proper.
- e. **SCANDINAVIA.**--Several instances of sabotage of Norwegian military installations indicate the possibility of a concerted Communist sabotage program. Despite rumors, there is no reliable evidence of concurrent increased Soviet pressure on Finland.
- f. **GERMANY.**--There has been a probable increase of about 32,000 Soviet troops in Germany since late September, but there is additional evidence of the release of one class of Soviet MC's from Europe. Unconfirmed reports indicate that the Soviet airfield expansion program in Germany is being continued. The East German Alert Police have completed their initial training program, are being organized into tactical units, and East German ground strength will probably be doubled within the next year. The East German Foreign Ministry is reportedly establishing an elaborate telecommunications network with other Communist capitals which may be intended for military purposes. Recent violations of flight regulations over West Germany by Communist aircraft are a threat to safety and possibly deliberately provocative. East German propaganda against the U. S. has increased.

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5. **EASTERN EUROPE.**--There is now reliable evidence of the establishment of Polish armored units. Continuing increased security measures have been noted in Rumania and Poland.
3. **COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES.**--Chinese Communist capabilities for military action in Korea continue to increase and Viet Minh capabilities are gradually increasing. Capabilities in Europe are increasing with the continuing build-up of Satellite forces and improved logistical and communications facilities.

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TAB "A"

REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

Proceedings of the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee  
21 November 1950

1. Indications of Intentions in the Far East.

a. Available information on Chinese Communist activities within the past week revealed no significant new developments with regard to their intentions but generally supported previously reported trends. There continued to be no indication of enemy offensive preparations in Korea, but there were continuing reports of the northward movement of Chinese Communist troops, of Chinese defensive measures and of general military preparations for the eventuality of war. Propaganda continued to charge the U.S. with aggressive designs against China.

- (1) In Korea, Communist forces generally continued their tactics of limited withdrawals and delaying actions. There was no definite indication that enemy forces were preparing a general defense line or that the Chinese Communists have selected any area for an all-out defense. There was also no evidence to indicate that these withdrawals were in preparation for a counter-offensive, and enemy forces generally showed little aggressive tendency and no great will to fight. The interrogation of a number of Chinese PW's revealed that many of them were former Nationalists who had had little training, and that they have little equipment, a poor supply system and in some cases are short of food. Few of these prisoners knew when they crossed the Yalu that they were to fight U.S. forces and their discovery of the identity of opposing forces accounted for many surrenders. The statements of these prisoners indicate that Chinese Communist forces in Korea are not "volunteers" and also that the Chinese troops encountered to date are not representative of the best troops of the Fourth Field Army. There is also no indication that the Chinese troops have been supplied with good equipment. With the freezing of the Yalu River, which normally occurs in late November, Chinese capabilities for logistical support of their forces in Korea will be substantially increased as the ice on the river will support fully loaded heavy trucks.

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- (2) Although firm evidence is lacking, it appears probable that the pilots of the enemy jet aircraft operating from bases in Manchuria are Chinese Communists. Pilots have frequently failed to press attacks, despite superior aircraft performance. The pilots have handled their aircraft poorly and their gunnery has been poor. Reports of the training of Chinese Communist pilots by the Soviets indicate that Chinese pilots are available, and a recent unconfirmed report states that an air command post, presumably Chinese Communist, has been established in Mukden. There is a possibility that aircraft from Soviet units have also appeared over North Korea, however. On 16 November, a flight of U.N. bombers was followed for a hundred miles, but not attacked, by two MIG-15 aircraft which disappeared in the direction of Vladivostok.
- (3) In Communist China, reports of northward troop movement, although diminished in volume within the past week, continued to indicate that sizable movements of troops and supplies were still under way during the first two weeks of November. Additional reports tended to confirm that a portion of the Third Field Army has moved northward from Shanghai, possibly to the Shantung Peninsula.

[redacted] a very large number of trains were carrying troops and equipment north from Nanking to Tientsin, that only express was being moved because of military requirements and that freight trains were returning empty from the north. If these troop movements were in fact continuing as far north as Tientsin, their destination may well be Manchuria, but there is as yet no firm evidence of the movement of Third Field Army units into Manchuria. A report [redacted] on 13 November stated that aircraft were being moved north and that tanks which had come from Manchuria were being returned to the north, and numerous sources have confirmed that Soviet military personnel and technicians have moved northward from Shanghai. [redacted]

[redacted] Third Field Army troops are moving through Kwangtung Province into Canton for transport northward, that the movement of stores and ammunition northward continues, and that large amounts of POL are being smuggled in from Hong Kong and also moved north. An unconfirmed report has indicated that elements of various Chinese Communist units are being moved northward, presumably for service in Korea, that the basic unit to aid in operations in the north is a company and that each division is expected to produce approximately one battalion by requiring each

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platoon to furnish three soldiers. Such a method of selection would be consistent with previous Chinese Communist practice in the invasion of Hainan, is also consistent with early reports of the composition of units in Korea, and could account in part for the numerous reports of small troop unit movements and diverse identifications.

- (4) Additional information on Chinese defensive measures has included reports that factories are being evacuated from Kwangtung Province and Canton, that security precautions have been tightened in Shanghai and Canton, and that air raid precautions are being hastened in South Central China. Increased stress on the formation of local militia units was reported from many areas of China. Airfields at Hankow, Peiping and Canton are being prepared for jet operations according to reports from several sources. [redacted] reported on 14 November that emergency reconstruction of White Cloud airfield was under way with the work to be completed in November and that a Communist official had stated that new types of aircraft were soon to arrive "because of the present international situation." General Chinese apprehension that war is imminent appeared unabated, and there were reports for the first time of arrests of citizens for listening to the Voice of America.
- (5) There was no indication, from the tenor of Chinese Communist propaganda during the week, that the Chinese Communist delegation to the U.N. would be prepared to accept American assurances that the U.S. has no aggressive designs on China. The Peiping radio on 17 November, in a reply to President Truman's statement on this subject, reaffirmed previous assertions that the U.S. was preparing to invade China and stated that U.S. declarations "are not convincing anyone" in China. In Moscow, the newspaper Izvestia stated on 19 November that the U.S. was conducting a provocative and aggressive policy towards China and was "deliberately seeking to provoke war against China." An announcement of the Central Committee of the North Korean Communist Party on 19 November stated that their reverses by no means signified defeat. The retreat was described as temporary with the object of preparing a decisive blow to the American hordes and gaining ultimate victory. The announcement also stressed the importance of the Korean situation to China. This announcement has been broadcast by the Moscow radio for domestic consumption.

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- (6) The following report on alleged Communist strategy in Korea is unconfirmed but not inconsistent with Chinese action to date: At a conference between Chinese Communist leaders and Soviet advisers on 3 November it was reportedly decided that the Chinese Communists would (a) fight a war of maneuver in Korea, avoid major battles, stall for time and drain U. S. manpower; (b) attempt to prevent decisive action in the U.N. and split the Western powers on the Korean issue; (c) continue the enlistment of "volunteers" but make no declaration of war; and (d) remove industries from Manchuria to Northwest China to provide for the exigencies incident to the failure of this strategy.
- (7) The reported but unconfirmed shipment of Soviet mines and torpedoes to China could be for one or more of the following purposes: defense of the Chinese coast or a counter-action to any future blockade; the use of Chinese submarines; the use of Chinese ports by Soviet submarines (which if true might be an indication of the terms of the Sino-Soviet treaty).

b. In Indo-China, Viet Minh activity during the past week has been primarily designed to maintain pressure on French units, particularly in the Tonkin area. Viet Minh harassing actions and attacks on small posts have occurred both east and west of Hanoi and on the road from Hanoi to Dinhlap in the northeast, but in none of these operations has there been any indication of the massing of forces or the coordinated large-scale movement of Viet Minh units. Shipment of tanks to the Viet Minh is a probable development for the near future although such shipments from Hainan are as yet not confirmed. In addition to arms smuggling from Hainan by sea (which has been partially interdicted by the French), a Viet Minh air supply route has been established from Hainan and equipment for receiving air-dropped supplies has been set up at fields in Tonkin and at a new field in northern Annam. The French consider that the most favorable season for a major Viet Minh effort in the Delta will be between 1 November and 1 February and are particularly concerned about the period from 10 to 31 December. Viet Minh mobility is less affected by poor weather conditions than is the French, however, and Viet Minh operations are more likely to be based on the progress of their own build-up and French capabilities than on weather factors. Present indications are that the Viet Minh build-up for future operations against the Delta area is continuing and that harassing and probing pressure will be maintained constantly. There are no indications of a Chinese invasion, although the danger of Korean-style intervention will grow should the Viet Minh show signs of faltering. [redacted] has reported a strong possibility of Viet Minh attacks in Laos within the next few days.

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c. A series of Communist-inspired fire raids in Indonesia, which began on 10 November, has resulted in the loss of half the 1950 crop of Java's finest tobacco. Although the gradually deteriorating security conditions in Indonesia during the past several months are in part the cause of this action at the present time, the boldness of the Communist attacks suggests outside direction. There are indications that the government is planning and undertaking stringent measures against Communist and labor organizations, and the struggle between left-wing groups and the government is expected to be intensified in coming weeks.

d. Reports persist that Chinese Communist troops have encroached on Burmese territory in the northern Kachin state and that skirmishes with Kachin troops have taken place. The Chinese Communist intransigent attitude towards Tibet has increased Burmese worries that the Chinese will assert their claims to northern Kachin territory. It is probable that the present troop movement across Kachin territory involved some 2,000 Chinese troops en route to Tibet. Reports [ ] have tended to refute previous reports that Chinese troops had entered Tibet proper.

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e. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) Chinese Communist activity indicates continued military preparations in North China and Manchuria for the support of extended, long-term operations in Korea. The military activity of Chinese Communist troops in Korea so far is not sufficient to indicate the existence of a plan for major offensive operations, and the action at present appears to have been undertaken with the objective of prolonging attritional warfare against the U.N. forces. The extensive Chinese preparatory measures indicate that the Communist regime has anticipated that its actions may result in the extension of the conflict into Manchuria and North China. The shift of Soviet advisory personnel from Central China to Manchuria probably also indicates that the training and re-equipping of Chinese Communist forces may be conducted in the north.
- (2) Present Viet Minh activity indicates a policy of constant harassment of French forces in Tonkin while the build-up of the Viet Minh for major operations continues. There are no firm indications of when such large-scale attacks will be launched, although the French believe that the period between 10 and 31 December will be critical. There is a possible threat of Viet Minh attacks in Laos.
- (3) There is continuing evidence of increasing Communist dissident activity and sabotage in Southeast Asia.

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2. Indications of Intentions in Europe and the Near East.

a. The sabotage of two, and possibly three, widely separated Norwegian military installations on 16 November has indicated a definite possibility of concerted Communist sabotage action in that country. The installations involved were the Bardufoss airbase in northern Norway (at which several bunkers containing a considerable quantity of ammunition were destroyed by fires set off, evidently, by incendiary time pencils), Sola airfield near Stavanger (where 20 pairs of cables leading from the airfield to the seaplane base were cut), and an ammunition depot at Trondheim (where a wire fence was cut but no actual damage reported). Although Norwegian defense officials have suggested that the saboteurs may have been young Air Force conscripts and have been inclined to attach only minor significance to the actions, the coincidence of these events suggests more than haphazard efforts. Initial reports indicated a possible connection between these events and a reported increase in Soviet radio traffic in the Murmansk area and the Aaland Islands and the alleged delivery of a Soviet demand to Finland.

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Another recent indication of Soviet interest in the Baltic was the purchase during October of about 700 Norwegian and Danish nautical charts by officers of a Soviet vessel during its visit to Sweden.

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b. Additional reports on Soviet troop rotation in Germany now indicate the arrival of about 48,000 new troops between 21 September and 4 November and the departure during that period of approximately 16,000, resulting in an apparent net increase of about 32,000 to date. Although there is no firm basis for determining whether the present increase is temporary or permanent, the additional evidence that some troops are leaving provides further confirmation that the NCO's of the 1926 class are being demobilized in Europe. There is as yet no indication that Soviet anti-aircraft guns have been emplaced at the Oder River bridges, despite the movement of a Soviet AAA division to this area. Two Soviet ground attack regiments have been moved to newly completed airfields in the western portion of the Soviet Zone of Germany, and unconfirmed reports indicate that land is being requisitioned at three new sites near the western border for further airfield enlargements.

c. Two recent violations of flight regulations over West Germany by Communist aircraft have indicated at least a reckless disregard of safety regulations and possibly deliberate attempts to provoke an incident. The Soviet plane transporting Maurice Thorez to Moscow failed to obtain clearance from the Frankfurt traffic center, resulting in the dispatch of a U. S. plane to identify it; the U.S.S.R. then filed a charge that its plane had been "attacked" by a U.S. jet. During the past week, 30 flights of Czech aircraft also overflew West Germany, en route to bring delegates to the peace congress, without obtaining prior permission. There has been a marked increase in East German propaganda attacks on Americans in the past few days.

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d. There is now considerable evidence that the East German Alert Police are being expanded and reorganized. Two reports have indicated that the ground element is to be doubled in strength, or increased to about 100,000, within the next year. The initial training program of the Alert Police was reportedly terminated on 1 November, rather than the previously indicated date of 1 December, and all units are now being organized into tactical battalions. This suggests that preparations are being made for the activation of regiments and possibly eventually of divisions. The present training schools for officers and NCO's are to continue but with fewer students. Other reports also indicate definite plans for the formation of an East German air unit, including preparations for a school for pilots, the adoption of an air force uniform, and the turnover of a Soviet airfield to the Germans.

e. The East German Foreign Ministry is reportedly soon to acquire a short-wave telecommunications network linking it with diplomatic posts in Eastern Europe, Moscow and the Far East. The plan provides for the installation of emergency gasoline generators in case of power failures, and this provision and the ambitious scope of the network appear entirely out of keeping with routine diplomatic needs of the East German Government. It is therefore possible that Soviet military requirements, rather than East German needs, have dictated the establishment of this elaborate network, which would be of great value in co-ordinating activities throughout the Satellite countries.


f. There were some further indications during the week of increased security measures in Eastern Europe and of the build-up of Satellite Armies. In Rumania, increased supervision of U.S. and British diplomats by the security police was reported, and the call-up of a new class to the army was officially announced. These are probably the men born in 1930 and the second class inducted this year, while one class has been released. Information from Poland now confirms previous indications that an infantry division at Gdansk (Danzig) has been converted to an armored division, and the movement of Polish armored troops into this area has been observed. There are also indications that an armored corps is being formed in northwest Poland with headquarters at Bydgoszcz. Also in Poland, there are reports that the Soviets are reactivating a former German training area in Silesia (near the Czech border) and that they are requisitioning large amounts of accommodations in the same area. This significant possibility is as yet unconfirmed, however, and recent observations have failed to reveal the presence of Soviet troops in the areas of the reported requisitioning.

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g. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) Available intelligence does not indicate the probability of Soviet or Satellite military action in Europe in the immediate future, but there is evidence of a continuing build-up of Satellite forces, particularly in East Germany.
- (2) Sabotage in Norway and other Soviet and Communist activity indicate that military and political preparations in Europe are continuing, despite an apparent previous lull in Soviet aggressiveness.

  
JOHN WECKERLING  
Brigadier General, GSC  
Chairman, Joint Intelligence  
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